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Abstract
Many of the previous studies that tried to assess the contractionay or expansionary effects of
depreciations or devaluations in less developed countries (LDCs) used official exchange rate
data and concluded that devaluations are contractionary in LDCs. However, due to capital
controls, there is a black market for foreign exchange in many of the LDCs. In this paper
when we use black market rates over the period 1975-1998 from 29 LDCs in a panel model,
we find that devaluations are expansionary. Thus, for an effective exchange rate policy the
official and black market exchange rates should be unified.
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I. Introduction 
          An  important  policy to gain international competitiveness in many less developed 
countries (LDCs) is said to be devaluation of their currency. Indeed, sometimes the 
International Monetary Fund considers the policy as a pre-condition for extending loans to 
these countries. By making exports cheaper in terms of foreign currency, we would expect 
devaluation or depreciation to stimulate exports. Furthermore, since devaluation also makes 
imports expensive in terms of domestic currency, we expect some substitution of domestic 
goods for imports. All in all, the aggregate demand is expected to increase, helping domestic 
economic activity to also increase. However, devaluation or depreciation has a side effect. 
Since it is inflationary, we would expect an increase in the cost of imported inputs, which in 
turn, contributes to the cost of production. This increased cost, in turn, decreases aggregate 
supply. Therefore, the ultimate impact on domestic production will depend on the extent of 
changes in both aggregate demand and aggregate supply. If aggregate supply declines more 
than the expansion in the aggregate demand, devaluation is said to be contractionary.  
         Bahmani-Oskooee  and  Miteza  (2003) who provide a comprehensive review of the 
theoretical and empirical studies conclude that in most LDCs devaluations are 
contractionary. Empirical studies reviewed by Bahmani-Oskooee and Miteza (2003) all 
employed official exchange rate data in their analysis. However, due to restrictions on capital 
flows there exist black markets for foreign currencies in many less developed countries. 
Since black market exchange rates are perceived to be good proxies for floating rates, we 
suspect that they may have a favorable effect on domestic output. Indeed, Bahmani-Oskooee 
(1993) in the case of Iran, Luintel (2000) in the case of Asia, and Nagayasu (2002) in the 
case of Africa have shown that Purchasing Power Parity is supported relatively more often 
when black market exchange rates are used. Furthermore, Bahmani-Oskooee and Tanku 
(2007) have shown that speed of adjustment between changes in the exchange rate and 
relative prices is faster when the black market rate is considered as compared to the official 
exchange rate. This implies that changes in foreign prices are transmitted to changes in 
domestic prices relatively more through the adjustment in the black market exchange rates as 
compared to official rates. The same will be true if we consider changes in the prices of 
imported inputs, implying that contractionary or expansionary effects of movements in the   2
black market exchange rates will be more pronounced than those of the official rates. Thus, it 
is the main purpose of this paper to assess the effects on domestic output of changes in the 
black market rates. To this end, we introduce the model and the method in section II and 
report the empirical results in section III. Section IV provides our concluding remarks. Data 
definitions and sources are cited in an appendix.   
II. The Model and Methodology
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                    Previous research that tried to assess the contractionary effects of devaluation or 
depreciation on output included three policy variables that are said to be the most important 
tools in affecting domestic output. These policy variables are E, denoting the exchange rate; 
M, a measure of monetary policy, and G, a measure of fiscal policy. Thus, following 
Edwards (1986) and Bahmani-Oskooee and Miteza (2006) we specify our model by the 
following equation:  
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where all right-hand side variables are defined above. The left-hand side variable Y is a 
measure of real GDP and ε is an error term. If expansionary monetary or fiscal policies are to 
have positive effects on output in the long run, estimates of δ and λ should be positive. 
Furthermore, as the appendix shows, E is defined as the number of units of country i’s 
currency per unit of the U.S. dollar. Thus, if an increase in E or a depreciation of domestic 
currency is to be expansionary, an estimate of β should be positive. For contractionary 
devaluations, therefore, we would expect an estimate of β to be negative. 
        The next question is how to estimate the model outlined by (1). Since the real GDP data 
comes only annually, the most efficient estimate of (1) would be the one that uses many 
observations. Since this is not possible at individual country level, we adhere to panel data 
that pools data across as many countries as possible, and over time. However, before we 
estimate (1) by any panel estimation technique, we must establish that the variables in (1) are 
                                              
1 The methodology in this paper closely follows that of Bahmani-Oskooee et al.  (2002).     3
indeed cointegrated. The common practice here is to rely upon Engle-Granger (1987) 
concept of cointegration and show that variables in (1) are individually integrated of order 
one, I(1), but the residuals in (1) as a proxy for a linear combination of all variables are 
integrated of order zero or I(0). The main difference is that the integrated properties of 
variables and the residuals must be established within a panel framework.  
        A few panel unit-root tests that have been introduced in the literature are based on the 
standard ADF test, with some modifications that account for heterogeneity in the panel data.          
In this paper we rely upon the one by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) which allows for 
heterogeneity in intercepts as well as in the slope coefficients. For a variable Z, the Im, 
Pesaran, and Shin (IPS) test is based on the following equation: 
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where i = 1, 2, …,N and t = 1,2,…,T. The null hypothesis of βi = 0, for all i’s is tested 
against the alternative hypothesis of βi < 0. The Im, Pesaran, and Shin statistic is, in 













                               (3) 
In a further step, the above t-bar statistic is standardized so that it converges to a standard 
normal distribution as N grows very large. 
         While the above test is applied for each variable, the one applied to the residuals of (1) 
to test for cointegration requires additional modifications. Here we follow Pedroni (1995, 
1997, 1999) who has constructed a framework that allows testing for cointegration of 
homogeneous and heterogeneous panels with multiple regressors. These modifications are 
not repeated here but explained intuitively in Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (2002), and technically 
in Bahmani-Oskooee and Miteza (2006). The two tests that are applied to the residuals of (1) 
to establish cointegration are called Panel-ADF and Group-ADF statistics.    4
III. Empirical Results 
        Since our intension is to determine whether changes in the black market exchange rates 
have expansionary or contractionary effects on domestic output, we restrict ourselves to a 
period of analysis for which all variables are readily available. In our empirical analysis we 
use annual observations for 29 developing countries over the period 1975-1998 where data 
for the black market exchange rates were available. The list of countries includes: Chile, 
Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. Note that we assess the impact of both nominal black market rate (NBLR) as well 
as the real black market exchange rate (RBLR) on output. 
          We first report the results of the panel unit roots for each variable in Table 1.  
Table 1 goes here 
It is clear from Table 1 that the calculated statistic for each variable and for each group is 
greater than the critical value of –1.96 from the standard t-table in most cases, indicating that 
the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected. Therefore, we assume all variables 
to contain a unit root and move on to cointegration tests.  Next, we calculate the Panel-ADF 
and Group-ADF statistics for cointegration among the variables of equation (1) and report 
the results in Table 2. 
Table 2 goes about here 
       No matter which case and which exchange rate we consider, the calculated ADF statistic 
is much less than the critical value of –1.96 form the standard t-table, indicating that the null 
of non-stationary residuals in equation (1) is rejected or all variables are cointegrated. Now 
that we have established the fact that variables have a long-run relationship the last step is to 
estimate the models. To engage in some sensitivity analysis, we estimate the models using 
four different techniques. First, we apply OLS to the panel data and label this initial step as 
Case 1. Next, we assume each cross-sectional unit and each time period are characterized by   5
their own special intercept (Kmenta, 1986, page 630) and include country dummy variables. 
We label this case as Case 2.  In Case 3, we assume that residuals within each time period are 
correlated and estimate a so-called random-effect model by GLS or by Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (Case 4). The results for each case using the nominal black market exchange rate 
first and then the real black market exchange rate are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3 goes here 
         From the results we gather that in most cases nominal or real depreciation is 
expansionary since the Ln E variable carries a positive and highly significant coefficient. 
This finding using the black market exchange rate contradicts most of the previous research 
which used official exchange rates and concluded that currency depreciations in LDCs are 
contractionary. One major policy implication of our finding is that if developing countries 
are to benefit from devaluation or depreciation they should unify the two rates.  
        The results in Table 3 also reveal that monetary policy is very effective in stimulating 
domestic output in the long run. However, fiscal policy seems to have an adverse effect on 
output in the long run since Ln G carries negative coefficients in most models. This could be 
due to a crowding-out effect of increased government spending, or the fact that limited 
governments are more conducive to economic growth.  
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
                 Regardless of the estimation technique, the majority of studies related to less 
developed countries (LDCs) have concluded that indeed, devaluations are contractionary in 
LDCs. They have arrived at such a conclusion by using the official exchange rate data. 
However, due to restrictions on capital flows in most less developed countries, there is a 
black market for foreign exchange in most of them. Our conjecture in this paper is that since 
the black market rates are proxies for equilibrium exchange rates that are based on market 
forces, using these black market rates may yield a different outcome than previous research. 
        Therefore, in this paper we use a reduced-form model that has been used by previous 
research and replace the official exchange rate by the black market rate from 29 developing   6
countries for which data for all variables were available. The list of countries includes: Chile, 
Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. Annual data over the period 1975-1998 from all 29 countries are pooled together 
to estimate panel models using panel cointegration and four different panel estimation 
techniques. In six out of eight models estimated the results showed that indeed nominal or 
real depreciation of the black market exchange rate is expansionary in LDCs. A policy 
recommendation of our finding is that for effective exchange rate policy, developing 
countries should unify the two exchange rates.  
APENDIX 
All data are annual over the period 1975-1998 and collected from the following two sources. 
a. International Financial Statistics of the IMF. 
b. World Currency Year Book, different issues. 
Variables: 
Y = Real GDP. To make it unit-free and homogenous across countries, for each country it is 
expressed in index form with base year at 1998. Data come from source a. 
M = Real money supply. M2 monetary figure is deflated by GDP deflator (or CPI in its 
absence) to arrive at M. It is then set in index form. All data come from source a. 
G = Real government spending. Nominal figures are deflated by a price index (GDP 
deflator or CPI) to arrive at real figures. The real figures are then set in index form to make 
data homogenous across countries.  
E = Black market exchange rate. For each country it is defined as number of units of that 
countries currency per US dollar. These rates that come from source b are also set in index 
form. The real black market rate is defined as (Pus.E/Pi) where Pi is the price level in 
country i and Pus is the price level in the US. This rate is also set in index form.     7
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Table 1: Panel Unit Root Test Results (IPS Statistic). 
  Variable 
    LogY    LogNBLR   LogRBLR   LogM     LogG   
(no trend, no time dummies) 
5.16    6.13    -2.84    -2.17     -2.54 
(with heterogeneous trend, no time dummies) 
-0.89    -0.44    -1.43    -10.06     -6.39 
 
(with heterogeneous trend and time dummies) 
-2.13    1.92    -0.74    -5.05     -3.85 
          
 
Table 2: Panel Cointegration Test Results 
                                                                  Using the Nominal     Using the Real 
      Black Market Rate    Black Market Rate 
 
 
Panel ADF Stat. (Heterogeneous Case)          -4.06         -5.56 
 
Group ADF Stat. (Heterogeneous Case)       -26.87          -19.01 
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Table 3: Estimates of Cointegrating Vectors Normalized on Output. 
 
 
            Coefficient Estimates of 
    
                                                    Ln E                  Ln M                  Ln G               Adj. R2      
 
 Models with Nominal BLR 
          Case 1                           -0.02 (2.87)           0.16 (5.43)            0.07 (1.93)            0.23 
          Case 2                           0.11 (15.2)           0.35 (11.8)           -0.10 (2.57)            0.16 
          Case 3                           0.10 (14.3)           0.36 (11.3)            -0.08 (2.07)           0.17 
          Case 4                           0.10 (14.8)           0.34 (11.6)            -0.09 (2.33)                - 
 
Model with Real BLR 
          Case 1                          -0.06 (1.52)           0.19 (6.03)             0.03 (0.84)            0.22 
          Case 2                           0.13 (3.57)           0.37 (10.3)            -0.12 (2.70)           0.19 
          Case 3                           0.12 (3.22)           0.34 (9.93)            -0.10 (2.29)           0.19 
          Case 4                           0.12 (3.35)           0.35 (10.1)            -0.10 (2.42))                - 
 
 
Note: Numbers inside the parentheses are the absolute values of the t-ratio. 
 
 
 